In a sense, democracy and the military are inherently at odds. The shouting commands of a drill sergeant to an obedient line of unified, clean-shaven soldiers hardly strike of a democratic exchange of ideas. Secrecy and strategic stealth, hallmarks of military success, stand in marked contrast to the healthy preconditions of open government and freedom of the press. Perhaps it is striking, then, that the United States, the oldest liberal democracy in the world, has achieved the most overwhelming military force in history. Today, the United States’ military budget of $448 billion is only slightly less than the rest of the world’s combined $500 billion. The phenomenon raises the question: how is the United States’ political culture related to its approach to warfare?
In truth, the dual success of American democracy and American military supremacy are not unrelated anomalies. Rather, the superiority of the American military is directly linked to the way in which it is closely intertwined with civilian political, economic and social culture. The technology-oriented, market-based defense establishment has allowed for a diffuse infrastructure closely tied to civilian doctrine. The result has been a relatively efficient system of weapons procurement compatible with the liberal values of society at large. Civilian control in the realm of grand strategy and operational capacity, however, remains more tenuous. The vocalization of military policy preferences, particularly in the aftermath of Vietnam, has created a fighting force ineffective in dealing with the challenges of today’s international system, namely small-scale interventions and counterinsurgency. Accordingly, civilian leaders must take on a more assertive role in checking the military’s influence in grand strategy and operational priorities.
At the dawn of American intervention in WWII, Dr. Harold Lasswell alluded to the possibility of the United States’ transforming into a “garrison state,” in which “authority will be dictatorial, governmentalized, centralized, [and] integrated.” Less than two decades later, Dr. Samuel Huntington offered a new paradigm in civil-military relations in his seminal book, The Soldier and the State. Advocating “objective control,” Huntington suggested that an optimal form of civil-military organization is one in which political leaders achieve their objectives by professionalizing the officer corps. This would involve granting the military autonomy and independence from civilian input within a clearly defined sphere of activities. There is a common thread in Lasswell and Huntington’s work: emerging military threats may lead the United States to broaden the power of military professionals at the expense of civilian control. Both Lasswell and Huntington envision a growing role for military professionals at the expense of civilian control in decisions involving war and the state.
Since WWII, however, the military-industrial complex has remained closely tied to the liberal ideals of society at large. Quite evidently, the massive defense infrastructure of the United States and its expansive network of bases and installations across the globe extend far beyond what the Framers envisioned. Rather than becoming a Lasswellian “garrison state,” the United States largely resolved the potential tension between civil liberties and a standing army by embracing a liberal, market-oriented defense strategy. Aaron Friedberg terms it the “contract state.” Specifically, three aspects of the national security bureaucracy exemplify this model: civilian predominance in military affairs, the significance of outside technological innovation, and the all-volunteer force.
The defense establishment has gradually witnessed a rise in civilian influence. As of 2000, the Department of Defense employed 700,000 civilians. Beyond military personnel, civilian policymakers, scientists, engineers, mathematicians, economists, and academic consultants represent a significant share of the national security infrastructure. In contrast to European style state-run industries, the relative efficiency of private contractors operating on market principles allows for less military spending and a greater diffusion of the military away from centralized government. The unprecedented importance of technology has proven particularly important in increasing civilian predominance. As American missions have utilized less conventional arms and more laser-guided missiles, air power, and electronic warfare, civilian technological and management skills have become vital. Even in terms of military recruitment, the free-market nature of the all-volunteer army has forced the military to develop high-tech advertising campaigns and financial incentives on an essentially corporate model.
Civilian control over the military remains more tenuous, however, in the realm of grand strategy and operational capacity. The result has been a severe lack of strategic thinking and capabilities in areas such as small-scale interventions and counterinsurgencies. Particularly in the post-Vietnam era, the military has taken on a noticeably distinct identity from the broader nation. For instance, while the country is roughly split between Democrats and Republicans, the military overwhelmingly votes Republican. This discrepancy is not problematic in itself; in a sense, it is expected given that an all-volunteer force is more likely to attract certain types of individuals than others. Rather, the situation is troublesome because the schism has increasingly manifested itself in a way that thwarts civilian leaders’ international agenda. The reality is that military organizational preferences can affect the success of civilian strategic prerogatives, and that this problem is amplified in a politicized military.
The divide has resulted, in part, out of the military’s resentful conviction that civilian leaders lost Vietnam by ignoring the Joint Chiefs. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the United States Army essentially refocused its force structure and doctrine with an emphasis on conventional wars rather than peace operations and counterinsurgency. The Powell Doctrine is a particularly vivid product of this post-Vietnam era military thinking. While Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s thinking fell in line with the military, the Clinton Administration showed a greater proclivity for small-scale humanitarian interventions and limited air campaigns. Accordingly, while the military performed effectively in the Persian Gulf War, it proved less capable in Somalia and Bosnia.
The Iraq War has further exemplified the ramifications of military priorities. While the United States dramatically defeated Iraq’s conventional army, it proved unprepared and ineffective in handling the postwar insurgency. Responsibility for post-invasion troubles does not fall solely on the military; many have suggested, for instance, that due to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s vision of fighting the war with a “small footprint,” the United States did not send enough troops to secure Iraq. Nevertheless, the military is marked by an institutional aversion to counterinsurgency. The situation in Iraq is in many ways the consequence of the military’s misguided prerogatives over the last few decades. The military, typical of any bureaucracy, is inclined toward entrenched policy preferences that can stifle effective policymaking.
The success of the defense establishment in areas such as technological innovation and efficient force recruitment, is tied to its embrace of civilian modes of management and market principles. The United States has unequivocally moved away from the “garrison state” model toward a business model in its defense arrangements. Yet in the development of strategic priorities, civilian leaders have granted the military too much autonomy, leading to a mode of civil-military relations lamentably close to Huntington’s ideal of “objective control.” The United States’ future challenges will likely involve open-ended commitments, counterinsurgency, nation-building, peacekeeping, and humanitarian intervention—exactly the types of operations the military traditionally has not prioritized. Thus, persistent civilian leadership may be necessary to bring about reform. At a broader level, policymakers should strive to structure the nation’s defense arrangements around the concept of civilian leadership. Such a model provides the greatest assurance of efficiency, open deliberation, and accountability. These goals serve not only the interests of combat effectiveness, but strengthen the institutions of liberal democracy.
