Not nice, but not torture

To the Editor:

Reading “Against Waterboarding: A Question of Values” in February’s Spectator, I was dismayed that Mr. Halenda does not explain exactly which “values” urge the prohibition of this infamous interrogation tactic, a failure leading to his muddled nonsolution to this ethical dilemma that ultimately decries what is doubtless a reasonable means of foiling terrorist plots. In the face of such quandaries, casuistry ever offers itself to the conscientious thinker. In this pursuit, a few principles seem clear:

1. Under certain circumstances, we are justified in executing an individual responsible for another’s murder.

2. We can kill an individual while he is in the process of trying to kill another if we exhaust all other avenues of stopping his crime.

3. An individual would rather be waterboarded than executed, given that the former practice does not cause long-term physical or psychological damage.

Punitive execution following a murder conviction is far from universally approved as an ethical policy. If one does deem the practice acceptable, however, it’s hard to see, in conjunction with principle 3) above, how one would object to waterboarding a terrorist certain to know information the authorities might use to avert a national disaster. Further, I would argue that if one accepts principle 2) above, which I doubt will turn out to be even remotely controversial, one is also committed to support the use of torture, including waterboarding, under the right circumstances.

Consider a situation in which a maniac chases after an individual brandishing some manner of bludgeon, announcing his intention to kill his quarry. This hypothetical is indubitably analogous to the situation in which CIA agents find themselves when interrogating a terrorist who knows the “when” and “how” of an imminent attack on defenseless citizens. As such, I would submit that agents may pursue any method that proves effective in preventing mass murder. As in the previous case, one must not stop trying until lives are saved; and, if, when there is no other option, we are within our rights even in killing a potential murderer to prevent the achievement of his crime, principle 3) above seems concomitantly conclusive in authorizing waterboarding as a just means of saving lives.

Even so, contrary to what Halenda suggests, waterboarding is not identical to “a murderer cocking a loaded gun to your head,” as evidenced by the fact that this latter tactic is hardly effective in coercing information out of a detainee. If it were, it would clearly be far easier a method of doing so than the very involved process of waterboarding which the CIA opts for instead. There are two reasons the threat of death would fail to inspire one to spill the beans: first, one is prepared to die for his cause, or second, one sees through the ploy and realizes he’s more valuable to his enemy alive than dead. As such, it is obvious that a waterboarded prisoner who wouldn’t flinch at the prospect of a suicide mission is in no way divulging information because “he fears for his life.” Rather, he is doing so because his captors are causing him “distress . . . that he can no longer bear.” The same subhuman, vile, inexpressibly heinous, and unmentionable “distress” caused by playful older brothers in swimming pools the world over, as Halenda sternly points out.

Ultimately, this line of reasoning leaves no room for doubt that in a situation posing imminent danger even to one innocent human life, waterboarding a would-be terrorist to extract time-sensitive information is entirely justified. Furthermore, given that this form of “torture” is indistinguishable from a summertime ritual perpetrated at one time or another against every boy in America and which rarely warrants even notifying an adult, it is hard to take concerns over the practice seriously, especially when professionals are administering the technique and lives are in the balance.

Sincerely,